

# ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILES AND THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the Vietnam war—and now the Middle East crisis—have dominated our thoughts and all but numbed our senses. Yet there is other pending national business that demands our attention. Aside from the Vietnam war, I believe the most pressing issue before us is whether the United States should build and deploy an antiballistic-missile defense.

I speak today in support of President Johnson and Secretary McNamara, who have decided against such deployment. As Senators know, the deployment of an ABM system has become a particularly serious issue now that the Soviet Union has deployed a so-called anti-ballistic-missile defense around Moscow in addition to the Tallinn system, which may or may not be a primitive antiballistic missile system, in other parts of the country. At the outset it should be stated that neither of these systems could protect Moscow or any other part of Russia from complete destruction by our intercontinental ballistic missiles were we to attack Russian targets in strength.

Nevertheless, a momentous question is now before us. Should we follow the Soviet Union's lead and deploy our own ineffective Nike X ABM's, or should we merely strengthen our offensive strategic weapons as the Secretary has recommended? Should not the United States resist the temptation to take its appointed turn in moving the nuclear arms race up one more notch?

In my view, the American public is thus far only dimly aware of the perplexing character of the antiballistic missile question and almost certainly unaware of the full implications of the choices we will be forced to make in the near future.

Let me say at once that I fully support the position of President Johnson and Secretary McNamara, as reflected in the Defense appropriations program for 1968, that the United States defer any decision on the deployment of an antiballistic missile system. President Johnson feels that our present research and development program is adequate and that his request for a contingency fund of \$377 million for a possible deployment of an anti-ballistic-missile system is all that is necessary at this stage. As Senators know, the United States and Russia have agreed to discuss the deescalation of both offensive and defensive nuclear weapons. It is hoped that negotiations will get underway in the immediate future. There is some reason to believe the Russians are not yet in accord within their own Government as to what line to pursue. We can afford to give them a reasonable time to make up their minds.

What concerns me this morning, Mr. President, is not the Defense Department's program for antiballistic missiles for fiscal year 1968, but reports that Secretary McNamara is under heavy pressure to decide favorably on the deployment of the so-called area and spot ABM defense for the United States.

The area defense concept calls for the emplacement of a number of Spartan anti-ballistic-missile batteries around

the periphery of the country with the mission to protect us from a "light" nuclear attack—whether launched by the Soviet Union or also, most notably and specifically, Communist China. Such a defense, if accompanied by a "spot" defense of sprint missiles deployed either around a few cities or more likely around our own ABM launching sites, might be effective against the first or even the second oncoming enemy IBM. It would be useless against an attack in strength.

I think it imperative that all of us should take a careful look at not only the military arguments for this ABM system, but also the psychological and political implications of such a program for both the United States and its allies. I say this because I am firmly convinced that if the United States should decide to deploy a "light" area and "spot" antiballistic-missile defense, we would simultaneously be making the decision to build and deploy a full anti-ballistic-missile system as well. Let us not be confused by what is at stake here. Our country is simply incapable of taking halfway measures.

Buy the area defense at bargain rates and you have bought the whole package at many times the cost. With this assumption as a starting point, the first question to be answered is: Why are we considering an anti-ballistic-missile system? Can it really protect us?

Mr. President, ever since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, sensible men have been saying that there is no defense against nuclear weapons. This does not mean that the United States is incapable of destroying attacking aircraft, submarines, or even some ballistic missiles carrying nuclear warheads. What it means is that there is no defense in sufficient depth against nuclear weapons which is reliable enough to prevent the offense from overwhelming the defense and destroying the target. Cyrus Vance, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, underlined this elemental fact of international life when he told the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last May something about "winning" a nuclear war:

Let me simply say—

And here I am quoting Mr. Vance—nobody could win in a nuclear war. It should be suicide for both countries.

Operating under this threat of what the distinguished senior Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN] has appropriately called coannihilation, the nuclear powers have made the foundation of their security the deterrence of nuclear attack not through defensive but through offensive weapons. To maintain this balance of coannihilation the United States and the Soviet Union have built powerful offensive strategic forces capable of overcoming all efforts at defense. In the process, the United States and the Soviet Union have reached a point of "nuclear standoff" where nuclear war has become unlikely under ordinary circumstances.

Despite the fact that an effective defense against nuclear attack is, for the foreseeable future, unattainable, the champions of defense systems such as the antiballistic missiles are constantly

trying. The United States and the Soviet Union have, since the war, invested enormous amounts in surface-to-air missiles in the hope of protecting their cities from aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. Each effort in both countries has failed. Radar networks, air defense centers, automatically aimed surface-to-air nuclear missiles of all varieties—all these are part of the many billions of dollars the United States and the Soviet Union have spent on defense in a futile attempt to keep up with the offense. The trouble is you cannot be even reasonably sure of hitting the first attacking missile and there is very little chance of hitting the second or third.

I give you one example of the futility of the defense in trying to catch up with the offense. In 1959, the U.S. Army proposed the deployment of the Nike-Zeus system, the father of the present highly touted Nike X system. The total cost of deploying the system was then estimated at \$13 to \$14 billion. This proposal was turned down by President Eisenhower who said that—

It is the consensus of my technical and military advisers that the system should be carefully tested before production is begun and facilities are constructed for its deployment.

I think we should remember these words as we approach the decision on the Nike X system.

We should also heed the words of Secretary of Defense McNamara when he referred to the Nike X system in January of this year. Mr. McNamara said:

Had we produced and deployed the Nike-Zeus system proposed by the Army in 1959 at an estimated cost of \$13 to \$14 billion, most of it would have had to be torn out and replaced, almost before it became operational, by the new missiles and radars of the Nike-X system. By the same token, other technological developments in offensive forces over the next seven years may make obsolete or drastically degrade the Nike-X system as presently envisioned.

The Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Foreign Relations Committee, of which subcommittee I am a member, has recently completed a series of hearings on the general question of what the United States should do about the Soviet Union's apparent decision to deploy an antiballistic missile system. The witnesses we heard included Richard Helms of CIA, John Foster, Director of the Defense Department's Research and Engineering, Drs. May and Bradbury, nuclear specialists of the AEC, Cyrus Vance, General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary Rusk. I came away from these hearings convinced that the present Soviet antiballistic defenses, both the Moscow system and the Tallinn system, are quite incapable of defending the Soviet Union or its people against anything except the most primitive missile attack. We were also told that our own Nike X system can easily be overcome by an all-out Soviet attack, no matter where our defenses are located or in what form.

Moreover, Secretary Vance told the subcommittee that if the United States built and deployed a Nike X system for the protection of our cities against the kind of sophisticated missile attack the

vide adequate education for our youth, to rebuild our cities, to feed the hungry, and to eliminate air and water pollution.

A large part of the problem we face with these new demands for an ABM deployment stems from that highly organized military-industrial complex against which General Eisenhower warned us in his last speech as President in these words:

In the councils of government—

He said—

We must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

President Eisenhower went on to say:

In holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become captive of a scientific-technological elite.

We should all realize that the United States is all too often victimized by the zeal of our scientific-military elite—the “weapons cult,” if you will. Let me read you what one such cultist has had to say about the advance of weapons technology and public opinion. In March of 1967, Dr. Harold Agnew, Director of the Los Alamos Laboratories Weapons Division, remarked that—

The basis of advanced technology is innovation and nothing is more stifling to innovation than seeing one's product not used or ruled out of consideration on flimsy premises involving public world opinion.

This is indeed a shocking statement and a dangerous one. If we have any role here in the Senate it is to advance what Dr. Agnew calls the flimsy premises of public opinion, or, in other words, the impact of an aroused democracy against the weapons cultists. Over the next few months, as the United States brings to a head this longstanding issue of whether to produce and deploy an ABM system, we will be inundated by all shades and varieties of expertise—both real and bogus. How can we be expected to sort out the scientifically sound from the self-serving? We will be asked whether the lives of a few million American citizens are not, for example, worth an investment of \$4 to \$5 billion. Senators will be hard pressed to deal with such arguments, particularly when the cultists are so anxious for their own pride and their pocketbooks to go forward with an ineffective ABM system.

I, for one, have confidence in the good sense of the American people, once they are informed of the facts. I do not believe that they or their representatives can be stampeded into taking an unwise, indeed a dangerous, step if they understand clearly the issue before them. But they must have the facts. They must have the benefit of full and free discussion in the Congress and in the public media, uninhibited by false demands for secrecy. We were told the basic facts in the hearings before the Disarmament Subcommittee, but then the testimony was so censored by the Defense Department, the AEC, and the CIA that I have been unable to use in this speech many facts the American people should be told. And this involves the clear and scientific reasons why our

ABM system is no good and why the Russian ABM system is no good. But I am not permitted to state these facts, because expediency has been allowed to intervene with what I believe is incontrovertible evidence to support my contention.

Mr. President, I am convinced that the construction and deployment of an ABM system at the present time is both unwarranted and unwise. I also believe that this conclusion is strategically sound and militarily defensible.

In any issue of this magnitude, however, there is inevitably a political consideration as well. At a time when the peace of the world is based to a large extent upon a tenuous balance of nuclear power—a delicate balance of terror, as it has been so often called—the concept of national security is directly affected by progress in the field of international disarmament—the only viable alternative to mutual annihilation.

It is for this reason, Mr. President, that I have long regarded the negotiations in Geneva on a nonproliferation treaty as of overriding importance to our own security, as well as to the security of other nations from which ours in part derives. I have also proposed that if agreement is ultimately reached on this issue, the chances for a further extension of the nuclear test-ban treaty to include underground experiments be explored in the light of current scientific detection techniques.

Unfortunately, as of this date, direct negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the ABM issue have not yet commenced. However, President Johnson and Premier Kosygin were afforded a unique opportunity at Glassboro to compare their respective positions on the question of anti-ballistic-missile defense systems and offensive weapons, as well as on more wide-ranging arms control measures. If the results of this meeting are to have any significant effect on the future of United States-Soviet relations, precipitate deployment action in the ABM field should be postponed at least until an intensive diplomatic effort to reach agreement has taken place and failed.

For it is apparent that the debate which has raged in the Pentagon in recent years over this subject has also been carried on behind closed doors in the Kremlin. Our deployment of an ABM system at this juncture without serious efforts to come to an agreement would certainly have the effect of strengthening the hand of those Russian military advocates of such an investment in the U.S.S.R.—probably at an accelerated pace. The result, I am convinced, would be a vast, competitive expenditure of money and resources with little gain in real defense capability for either side, as Mr. Vance has so clearly pointed out.

Mr. President, the history of the past two decades has taught us—if it has taught us anything—that every decision to escalate the arms race is an irrevocable decision in the long run.

Before such a decision is taken and in order to provide the public with a full and unbiased account of the ABM issue, I recommend to the President that he convene a blue ribbon commission to deal

with the question of an ABM system. Such a commission could provide a careful and objective evaluation of the course the United States should follow. The precedent for such a commission was established immediately after the Second World War when President Truman decided to establish an independent commission to assess the complexities of U.S. defense policies in the air age. The resulting report of what came to be called the Finletter Commission was bluntly entitled “Survival in the Air Age”; and this report, primarily because of the authoritative and independent stature of the commission members, came to be the focal point around which subsequent international discussions of air strategy revolved.

Ten years later—in 1957—President Eisenhower established a blue ribbon commission to assist him in coping with the problems of defense in the era of strategic missiles. Impressed by the military, political and even psychological implications of developing an American retaliatory offensive force President Eisenhower established the so-called Gaither Commission. The Gaither Commission was comprised of distinguished figures from the Nation's business, financial, scientific, and academic communities. These men included H. Rowan Gaither, a former head of the Ford Foundation, William C. Foster, now Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, James R. Killian of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Earnest O. Lawrence, I. I. Rabi, John J. McCloy and Jerome B. Weisner, who later became a Department of Defense adviser to President Kennedy.

There is no doubt that the Gaither Report had a significant effect both within and outside the U.S. Government and led to some very hard thinking about America in the missile age.

A critical moment in our Nation's life came when the Gaither report presented the President with an objective account of U.S. military strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union's and, in the process, I interpolate, Mr. President, it destroyed some myths which had been projected for a good long while by certain members of the military-industrial complex of which I have spoken today.

Now another 10 years have passed and again these seems to be justification for the President to convene another blue ribbon commission, this time to deal with the momentous question of ABM deployment. Surely the ABM question is of such magnitude that it is essential to have a careful and objective evaluation of the course the United States should follow. I do not believe, for the reasons I have already mentioned, that the military-industrial complex is objective enough to advise the U.S. Congress or the President on how we should proceed. This being the case, I strongly suggest that a temporary blue ribbon commission drawn from all sectors of national life is the best way to bring a thorough inquiry into the issues.

Our very national survival may be at issue in the ABM controversy. It is time we put the best and most objective minds in the country to work.